Introduction
In 2017, I was commissioned by Anglicare Tasmania to provide an economic evaluation of their campaign to remove poker machines from pubs and clubs and house them exclusively in casinos (Removing Poker Machines from Hotels and Clubs in Tasmania).
Australian Institute for Business and Economics director John Mangan and Anglicare Social Action and Research Centre manager Meg Webb review a report on pokies ban
Unlike most other forms of consumer spending, gambling has acknowledged and measurable social costs. Yet, most Australian states have come to rely on gambling taxation, arguing that revenue exceeds associated social harm. This argument could not be mounted in Tasmania. At the time, poker machine revenue constituted only two per cent of state revenue, with just over half of that coming from machines in hotels and clubs.
The report became the economic backbone of the anti‑pokies campaign. It was:
- Cited in ABC News, Nine, and Hospitality Directory
- Submitted to the Joint Select Committee on Future Gaming Markets
- Used by Anglicare and reform advocates to argue that Tasmania’s economy would benefit from removing pokies
It also strengthened Labour’s 2017 election policy, which closely mirrored the report’s modelling assumptions. Labour ultimately lost the election, and Anglicare’s bid to remove pokies from pubs and clubs was defeated.
This blog reflects on why a well‑organised, politically supported, publicly popular rand empirically backed social reform failed, and what this failure reveals about the difficulty of gambling reform in Australia.
Origins of the Reform Push (Pre‑2017)
Tasmania’s gambling landscape has long been shaped by the Federal Group monopoly, established through exclusive licensing arrangements developed in the 1990s. Poker machines were introduced into pubs and clubs under a regulatory framework that prioritised revenue generation and regional development over harm minimisation. Specifically, the Government traded tax revenue for promises of tourism infrastructure development.
By the mid‑2010s, Tasmania had one of the highest per‑capita electronic gaming machines (EGM) losses in Australia, concentrated in low‑income communities such as Glenorchy and Bridgewater (SEIFA Index of Relative Socio‑Economic Disadvantage). At this stage there were a number of structural features of gambling in Tasmania that required reform
These were:
- Monopoly structure whereby the Federal Group’s exclusive rights created a stable but politically sensitive revenue stream for government and venues.
- Weak harm‑minimisation regulation whereby Tasmania lagged behind other states on machine design restrictions, bet limits, and pre‑commitment systems.
- Growing public concern, where Community organisations increasingly framed poker machines as drivers of social harm rather than entertainment.
Anglicare’s Agenda‑Setting Role
Anglicare Tasmania emerged as the central civil‑society actor pushing for EGM reform. Through its Social Action and Research Centre, Anglicare produced a series of reports demonstrating:
- Concentration of losses in disadvantaged communities
- Links between EGMs and financial stress, family breakdown, and mental health issues
- The regressive nature of gambling taxation
Using this evidence, Anglicare built a strong coalition of:
- Community welfare organisations
- Churches
- Local councils
- Anti‑gambling advocacy groups
But still lacked empirical evidence to support their case
The Anglicare–Mangan Report: Evidence That Shifted the Debate (2017)
The turning point came in August 2017, when Anglicare released a landmark economic report produced by the Australian Institute for Business and Economics at UQ. The report argued that removing poker machines from pubs and clubs and that restricting them to casinos would produce net economic benefits for Tasmania.
Key findings included:
- Tasmanians lose $113 million a year on pub and club pokies.
- Redirecting even half of this spending into the broader economy would create 183 full‑time jobs and add $33 million annually to gross output.
- Redirecting all losses could create 670 jobs and add $91 million to gross output.
The report reframed the debate: pokies were not an economic necessity but a drag on local spending, with most profits leaking interstate. These findings were more detailed but broadly in line with an earlier Deloitte-Access report on Poker machine operation in Tasmania which found poker machine operation constituted a net social loss in Tasmania (Deloitte Access Economics (2015). Review of the Gaming Tax Regime in Tasmania. Report prepared for the Department of Treasury and Finance, Tasmania).
The UQ report gave reform advocates a credible economic narrative to counter industry claims about job losses. Anglicare’s coalition was strong enough that, in late 2017, the Tasmanian Labor Party adopted Anglicare’s position, announcing a policy to remove poker machines from pubs and clubs by 2023.
This was the first time a major party had endorsed removal of poker machines or any significant reforms to gambling in the Stata.
Industry Response: The Economic Fear Campaign
Federal Group and allied hospitality organisations launched an aggressive campaign against the removal poker machines from Pubs and clubs. Their strategy relied on employment fear narratives, warning of:
- Thousands of job losses
- Venue closures
- Regional economic collapse
These claims lacked empirical support and did not directly address the UQ report, but they were politically effective. Simultaneously, The industry:
- Increased political donations
- Intensified lobbying in marginal seats
- Framed removal as an attack on small business
- Saturated pubs and clubs with anti‑removal messaging
The debate shifted from harm minimisation to economic risk, undermining the evidence base that had been accumulated. The 2018 state election effectively became a referendum on poker machine policy.
Why the Reform Failed
Three dynamics explain the failure:
- Industry resources dwarfed those of reform advocates, amplifying fear‑based messaging.
- The Liberal Party opposed removal, promising to extend licences and positioning itself as the defender of small business and regional jobs.
- Labour struggled to counter the fear campaign, despite strong evidence.
Allied to this was Tasmania’s political culture. The State was the birthplace of the Greens and home to political independents such as Brian Harradine, Andrew Wilkie, and Jacqui Lambie. Its populace is highly sensitive to employment claims and perceived threats to personal freedom.
As a result of these factors, and despite strong public support (polling showed over 80% support for reform), the proposal failed. The episode demonstrated that:
- Evidence, especially expert‑produced evidence, is less politically powerful than fear‑based messaging.
- Economic modelling is complex; fear campaigns are simple.
- Voters in marginal seats respond strongly to employment claims.
- Gambling is framed by some voters as a matter of personal choice.
Aftermath
The bid to ban poker machines from Tasmanian pubs and clubs failed because evidence and public support were not enough to overcome entrenched commercial interests, political division, and a powerful fear campaign.
However, the reform movement did not disappear. The publicity surrounding Tasmania’s monopoly structure contributed to major structural changes:
- Transition from a single‑operator monopoly to a regulated multi‑licence system
- Introduction of mandatory pre‑commitment
- Expansion of cashless gambling and facial‑recognition controls
- Strengthened harm‑minimisation regulations
These reforms, documented in the Joint Select Committee on Future Gaming Markets Final Report, represent a partial overhaul of Tasmania’s gambling system, yet the impact in terms of additional revenue have been modest. In 2017/18 EGM revenue constituted 2.5% of State revenue. By 2025/26 it had risen to 4.5% – 5%. These percentages are similar to South Australia (4.5%-5%) less but comparable with Queensland and New South Wales (5% -5.5%) (State Budget papers, 2025/26)
However, there has been no attempt to cost/ benefit these gains with changes in the social cost of gambling which remains an externality in the current modelling of the social value of gambling in Australia
