Why Turning Professional Ruined Rugby Union

Introduction

Rugby union, traditionally an amateur sport, underwent a significant transformation when it turned professional in 1995. The move, which had significant impact on the Governance of the sport was intended to  improve its governance, player welfare, commercial opportunities, and the global reach of the sport, all of which it obtained in part. However, as I argue in this note, the move upset the balance between the elite players in the game and the large body of wiling amateurs that provided a relatively free supply chain for the code. The move to professionalism  allowed players , at all levels to gain an indication of their potential worth. Professionalism also required significant improvements to player performance, especially in defence. Prior to professionalism, tackling in Union was almost optional. This was important because, in a 15-player code, indifferent defence was a catalyst to allow  one of the attacking play for which such teams as “The Barbarians”  were rightly famous. Professionalism brought tight defence with a significant reduction in the openness of “running rugby” One wonders how famous attacking players as David Campese would cope with modern rugby or rugby league defences,

A feudal labour market

Prior to the switch to professionalism, the labour market was organised on a semi feudal basis. At the top were some  privileged officials and a group of elite players, who although ostensibly amateur, were well rewarded with employment, fringe benefits and benefits funnelled to their families under  system known as shamaterism (https://www.bing.com/ck and Rugby Football History)

Below this elite were an army of genuinely amateur players, constantly replenished from output of private schools. To maintain discipline, the myth of amateurism was maintained by attempting to block alternative pathways’ for players such as a shift to the professional code of rugby league.  To archive this draconian measures were taken including Rugby union authorities implemented several measures to enforce this divide, which have been likened to a form of “sporting apartheid”: Https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/mono/10.4324/9780203088357-17/sporting-apartheid-rugby-union-war-rugby-league

Discriminatory Practices

These discriminatory practices included

·         Lifetime Bans: Rugby union players who switched to rugby league were banned for life from playing or even being involved in rugby union1. This policy was strictly enforced, effectively ostracizing players who chose to play rugby league. Possibly the most extreme example of this was the banning of the former Welsh Captain David Watkins from Cardiff Armies Park for signing with Salford Rugby league club

·         Social Stigma: Rugby league players often faced social stigma and were viewed as lesser athletes compared to their rugby union counterparts. This was particularly evident in the media and public perception, where rugby union was seen as the sport of the elite, while rugby league was associated with the working class1.

·         Limited Opportunities: Rugby league players had fewer opportunities to represent their country on an international stage, as rugby union was the more globally recognized code. This limited their exposure and potential career advancements1

However, like all repressive system, the Rugby Union form broke down from both internal pressures and political action  by North of England politicians that forced the British sports council to threatened funding to the Rugby  Union  if they continued discriminatory practices towards rugby league (Rugby Union: Sports Council Funding (Hansard, 4 March 1993) . Faced with these issues, Union officials who had discriminated against defectors to Rugby league since 1898, now became great advocates of professionalism.

Professionalism had unanticipated consequences

Rugby Union had enjoyed 100 years of the hybrid system of elite players (well  rewarded under the policy of shamateurism) and rank and file players who maintained the club system, provided a support base and served as a pipeline to replenish the upper ranks. The well established international coverage of Union held up the promise of rich rewards to the players to follow the professional route.  In the first two decades after professionalism Rugby Union  was also able to reverse the flow of players leaving for Rugby league and instead attract rugby league converts to Union. These players were battle hardened to professional sport and brought that edge to Union. The famous Wigan/Bath cross code games of the clearly demonstrated the greater professionalism  of league (Wigan won the first game (RL rules )82-6) and lost the second game (RU rules 44-19 but, incredibly, won the second half) (Bing Videos). They also won the Middlesex 7s at Twickenham that same year. This display led to 10 of the Wigan players being poached to rugby in the following 5 years as players or coaches

Structural problems reduce “running rugby”

The issue that the Rugby union faced when turning professional was like that faced by the Rugby league during the breakaway years of the 1890s. In a professional standard team, 15 players on the field are simply too much. It increases team (labour costs) significantly as well as travelling and accommodation costs. It also introduces increased participants in the market such as player agents.  The current financial troubles of the Rugby Union  the UK and Australia are good examples of the financial problems ushered in by professionalism. Perhaps  more importantly it significantly constrains attacking play. Under the new, professionalism in defensive patterns (some brought in by Rugby league converts)level attack along the lines of the Barbarians type is almost impossible, Consequently  the game, with 30 players on the field has become bogged down in ruck play and excessive kicking, all of which were aided and abetted by pedantic refereeing. The default method of scoring  in Rugby union became ruck play until the inevitable penalty and then kick for goal , this led to a reduction in attacking play and , certainly in Australia, public interest.

Mixed results

Despite these structural issues, internationally, RU has continued to perform well. The  game has expanded in Italy, Argentina and Japan and is still very strong in South Africa and France, However in England and Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand  different results occurred  The Independent in the UK reported that “Seven Premiership clubs were deemed balance sheet insolvent” (“Seven Premiership clubs deemed balance sheet insolvent as rugby ‘heading for financial precipice’ |The Independent. UK teams  financial losses
Worcester and Wasps both went into administration in 2022 while London Irish filed for administration after being suspended from the Premiership for missing a deadline to pay players and staff or complete a takeover in June 2023
Profitability of the UK competition fell by 70% in 1922/23 from $15 Million to 4 Million. The figure of £4m is £11m lower than 2021-22 according to the report released by English rugby’s governing body on Friday. The RFU also said all debts from Covid-impacted years have been paid off with £24.9m in cash and £25m in deposits. The Conversation  argued that Rugby Union had reached its lowest ebb in Australia following the reduction in National teams and the embarrassing exit by the Wallabies at the 2023 World cup (Australian rugby has reached its lowest point. How did it get here?

This is compounded by legal action taken against the ARU by the Melbourne rebels ( fighting expulsion) and is further example of the lagged effects of professionalising a sport with a long history of amateur participation

A major issue faced by the ARU is the comparisons being drawn between their competition and game and that of the booming National Rugby League (NRL)

A similar comparison is now being drawn between Union and League in New Zealand/All Blacks will always be top dogs in New Zealand but NRL should fast-track South Island expansion.

While the All Blacks still reign supreme, local RU clubs are drawing less crowd than the New Zealand Warriors (Rugby League) where every home game in 2024 has been a sell out.  Again the domestic New Zealand union teams suffer from the comparison effect  with Rugby league, (https://www.theaustralian.com.au/sport/nrl/nrl-2024-warriors-popularity-could-which is not present in Europe

Conclusions

The experience of Rugby Unions since 1996 , highlights the difficulty of turning a quasi -amateur sport into a professional one. Gradually the many services of volunteers and amateurs get replaced by paid-for services and player costs inevitably inflate. Unlike Rugby league which  introduced structural change from the offset (a reduction in player number) the RU retained  their team structure. Maintaining 15 on field players necessitates a squad of 35 players compared with25-30 in league. Five additional players add at least  $3-5 million to the cost per team of operations, a problem  that teams like the now defunct Melbourne Rebels faced

Rugby union with its strong international base has capacity to remain strong in most parts of the world, however, the game failed  especially in England and Australia, to make the structural changes need in a fully professional game, a lesson that the breakaway Rugby league was forced to do from its onset.